


# You & Your Research

2011- @haroonmeer  
(haroon@thinkst.com)

# About: Me



@haroonmeer

[haroon@thinkst.com](mailto:haroon@thinkst.com)

<http://cc.thinkst.com/speaker/Meer/Haroon/timeline/>

<http://cc.thinkst.com/speaker/Meer/Haroon/timeline/>

<http://cc.thinkst.com/>

[jameel@thinkst.com](mailto:jameel@thinkst.com) / [@RC110](#)

# About: Dan

Con Collector

cc.thinkst.com/speaker/Kaminsky/Dan/

thinkst  
applied research


blog  
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folklore fun  
conference fun  
Login  
Speakers  
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Upcoming  
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**Speaker : Dan Kaminsky** [[Speaker-Timeline](#)] [[Speaker-Links](#)]  
Submit Patch For Speaker


Conference	Topic
CanSecWest-2011 - Canada- Vancouver	Showing How Security Has (And Hasn'T) Improved, After Ten Years Of Trying
Berlinsides-2010 - Berlin	Dankam : Augmented Reality For Color Blindness
Berlinsides-2010 - Berlin	Towards The Domain Key Infrastructure
Berlinsides-2010 - Berlin	Hacker Speed Debates
BlueHat-2010 - USA	The Unified Theory Of Dns Security
Defcon-18 - USA	Black Ops Of Fundamental Defense: Web Edition
Blackhat-10 - USA	Black Ops Of Fundamental Defense: Web Edition
SANS Pen Test Summit-2010 - Baltimore-Usa	Keynote: Penetration Testing By Targeting The Soft Underbelly Of Infrastructure
SANS Pen Test Summit-2010 - Baltimore-Usa	Speaker Panel: Most Effective New Technique Yove Applied In The Past 12 Months
QuahogCon-2010 - USA	Keynote - New Research Tba
Source Boston-2010 - USA	The Fine Art Of Hari Kari (.Js), And Other Approaches For The Strange Reality Of Web Defense
Chaos Communication Congress-26 - Berlin	Black Ops Of Pki
Defcon-17 - USA	Something About Network Security
Defcon-17 - USA	Hello, My Name Is /Hostname/
Blackhat-09 - USA	Something About Network Security
Source Boston-2009 - USA	The Partial Disclosure Dilemma
Source Boston-2009 - USA	Lessons Learned: Limited, Targeted, Collaborative Disclosure And Multi-Organizational Cooperation
Chaos Communication Congress-25 - Berlin	Why Were We So Vulnerable To The Dns Vulnerability?
BlueHat-2008 - Microsoft corporate headquarters	Black Ops 2008 ñ It's The End Of The Cache As We Know It
Defcon-16 - USA	Dns Goodness
Blackhat-08 - USA	Black Ops 2008 -- It's The End Of The Cache As We Know It
Chaos Communication Congress-24 - Berlin	Dns Rebinding And More Packet Tricks
Sector-2007 - Canada	Black Ops 2007: Dns Rebinding Attacks
BlueHat-2007 - Microsoft corporate headquarters	Black Ops 2007: Dns Rebinding Attacks
Blackhat-07 - USA	Black Ops 2007: Design Reviewing The Web
Shmoocon-2007 - Washington	Weaponizing Noam Chomsky, Or Hacking With Pattern Languages
Chaos Communication Congress-23 - Berlin	Black Ops 2006 Viz Edition
Defcon-14 - USA	Black Ops 2006

<http://cc.thinkst.com/speaker/Kaminsky/Dan/>


# About: Dan



# About: Dan



# About: Me



@haroonmeer

<http://blog.thinkst.com>

<http://cc.thinkst.com/speaker/Meer/Haroon/timeline/>

About: You!




& Your Research

# Setec Astronomy Setec Confer Moan (yo!..)



Number of Industry Related InfoSec conferences in 1997  
vs.  
Number of Industry Related Infosec conferences in 2010

Number of Conferences per year (1984-2010)




For || Against ?

# Setec Astronomy Setec Confer Moan (yo!..)




Number of Industry Related InfoSec conferences in 1997  
vs.  
Number of Industry Related Infosec conferences in 2010


Number of Conferences per year (1984-2010)




The Established Conferences keep getting bigger...



At Least one InfoSec Conference is going on in any given month (with 19 in October alone!)



That means an infosec conference is taking place for 205/365 days of the year





For | | Against ?



YES!

For Good Research


What's that?

Stuff we did the past year..  
<past year>





Speaker : Halvar Flake [List-Of-Talks] [Speaker-Timeline]




2 <sup>nd</sup> Level Nodes	Speaker	Reset Nodes
	Co Spoke With	
	Worked @ Company	
	Spoke @ Conference	





Memory Corruption Bugs as a  
Percentage of Total Reported Bugs



</past year>

i'm obviously poorly qualified



**Richard Hamming**

**``You and Your Research''**

Transcription of the  
Bell Communications Research Colloquium Seminar  
7 March 1986

“I'm not talking about ordinary run-of-the-mill research; I'm talking about great research”

...

“I mean those kinds of things which we perceive are significant things.”

Now, how did I come to do  
this study?

...

I saw I was a stooge.

I saw Feynman up close.

I saw Fermi and Teller.

I saw Oppenheimer.

I saw Hans Bethe..


I became very interested  
in the difference between  
those who do and those  
who might have done.

2 Paragraphs in...

ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ  
βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ

- Socrates

I became very interested  
in the difference between  
those who do and those  
who might have done.



I continued examining  
the questions,  
“Why?” and “What is the  
difference?”

Wait.  
Wasn't he a  
mathematician?

I will talk mainly about science because that is what I have studied. But .. much of what I say applies to many fields.



Outstanding work is characterized very much the same way in most fields,


I have to get you to drop  
modesty and say to  
yourself, "Yes, I would like  
to do first-class work."

I find that the major  
objection is that people  
think great science is done  
by luck.

Well, consider Einstein. Note how many different things he did that were good. Was it all luck? Wasn't it a little too repetitive?

You see again and again,  
that it is more than one  
thing from a good person.





**SEEING TROUBLE**  
Security researcher Dan Kaminsky first spotted a basic vulnerability in the Internet last winter.

## The Flaw at the Heart of the Internet

DAN KAMINSKY DISCOVERED A FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY PROBLEM IN THE INTERNET AND GOT PEOPLE TO CARE IN TIME TO FIX IT. IT'S A DRAMATIC STORY WITH A HAPPY ENDING ... BUT WE WERE LUCKY THIS TIME.

By ERICA NAONE

**D**an Kaminsky, uncharacteristically, was not looking for bugs earlier this year when he happened upon a flaw at the core of the Internet. The security researcher was using his knowledge of Internet infrastructure to come up with a better way to stream videos to users. Kaminsky's expertise is in the Internet's domain name system (DNS), the protocol responsible for matching websites' URLs with the numeric addresses of the servers that host them. The same content can be hosted by multiple servers with several addresses, and Kaminsky thought he had a great trick for directing users to the servers best able to handle their requests at any given moment.

Normally, DNS is reliable but not nimble. When a computer—say, a server that helps direct traffic across Comcast's network—requests the numerical address associated with a given URL, it stores the answer for a period of time known as "time to live," which can be anywhere from seconds to days. This helps to reduce the number of requests the server makes. Kaminsky's idea was to bypass the time to live, allowing the server to get a fresh answer every time it wanted to know a site's address. Consequently, traffic on Comcast's network would be sent to the optimal address at every moment, rather than to whatever address had already been stored. Kaminsky was sure that the strategy could significantly speed up content distribution.

It was only later, after talking casually about the idea with a friend, that Kaminsky realized his "trick" could completely break the security of the domain name system and, therefore, of the Internet itself. The time to live, it turns out, was at the core of DNS security; being able to bypass it allowed for a wide variety

of attacks. Kaminsky wrote a little code to make sure the situation was as bad as he thought it was. "Once I saw it work, my stomach dropped," he says. "I thought, 'What the heck am I going to do about this! This affects everything.'"

Kaminsky's technique could be used to direct Web surfers to any Web page an attacker chose. The most obvious use is to send people to phishing sites (websites designed to trick people into entering banking passwords and other personal information, allowing an attacker to steal their identities) or other fake versions of Web pages. But the danger is even worse: protocols such as those used to deliver e-mail or for secure communications over the Internet ultimately rely on DNS. A creative attacker could use Kaminsky's technique to intercept sensitive e-mail, or to create forged versions of the certificates that ensure secure transactions between users and banking websites. "Every day I find another domino," Kaminsky says. "Another thing falls over if DNS is bad. ... I mean, literally, you look around and see anything that's using a network—anything that's using a network—and it's probably using DNS."

Kaminsky called Paul Vixie, president of the Internet Systems Consortium, a nonprofit corporation that supports several aspects of Internet infrastructure, including the software most commonly used in the domain name system. "Usually, if somebody wants to report a problem, you expect that it's going to take a fair amount of time for them to explain it—maybe a whiteboard, maybe a Word document or two," Vixie says. "In this case, it took 20 seconds for him to explain the problem, and another 20 seconds for him to answer my objections. After that, I said, 'Dan, I am speaking to you over an unsecure cell phone. Please do not ever say to anyone what you just said to me over an unsecure cell phone again.'"

Perhaps most frightening was that because the vulnerability was not located in any particular hardware or software but in the design of the DNS protocol itself, it wasn't clear how to fix it. In secret, Kaminsky and Vixie gathered together some of the top DNS experts in the world: people from the U.S. government and

Photograph by JOHN KEATLEY

FEATURE STORY 43

“Luck favors the prepared mind”

The prepared mind sooner or later finds something important and does it.

So yes, it is luck. The particular thing you do is luck, but that you do something is not.

So what's a key  
characteristic ?

independent thoughts

+

the courage to pursue  
them

Lot's of Brains?

Great work is something  
else more than brains..

Bill Pfann  
&  
Clogston!

Once you get your courage  
up and believe that you  
can do important  
problems, then you can

Once you get your courage  
up and believe that you  
can do important  
problems, then you can

**Corelan Team**

*:: Knowledge is not an object, it's a flow ::*

Once you get your courage  
up and believe that you  
can do important  
problems, then you can



**Exploit writing tutorial part 1 : Stack Based Overflows**

Published July 19, 2009 | By [Corelan Team \(corelanc0d3r\)](#)

**Corelan Team**

*:: Knowledge is not an object, it's a flow ::*

Once you get your courage up and believe that you can do important problems, then you can

**Corelan Team**

**:: Knowledge is not an object, it's a flow ::**

### Exploit Writing Tutorials

- ▷ Universal DEP/ASLR bypass with msvc71.dll and mona.py
- ▷ Hack Notes : Ropping eggs for breakfast
- ▷ Hack Notes : ROP retn+offset and Impact on stack setup
- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 10 : Chaining DEP with ROP – the Rubik's[TM] Cube
- ▷ Exploiting Ken Ward Zipper : Taking advantage of payload conversion
- ▷ Ken Ward Zipper exploit write-up on abysssec.com
- ▷ QuickZip exploit article part 2 released on OffSec Blog
- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 9 : Introduction to Win32 shellcoding
- ▷ Starting to write Immunity Debugger PyCommands : my cheatsheet
- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 8 : Win32 Egg Hunting
- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 7 : Unicode – from 0x00410041 to calc
- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 6 : Bypassing Stack Cookies, SafeSeh, SEHOP, HW DEP and ASLR
- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 5 : How debugger modules & plugins can speed up basic exploit development
- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 4 : From Exploit to Metasploit – The basics
- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 3b : SEH Based Exploits – just another example
- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 3 : SEH Based Exploits
- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 2 : Stack Based Overflows – jumping to shellcode
- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 1 : Stack Based Overflows



### Exploits

- ▷ Metasploit Bounty – the Good, the Bad and the Ugly
- ▷ Universal DEP/ASLR bypass with msvc71.dll and mona.py
- ▷ Hack Notes : Ropping eggs for breakfast


mona.py

- ▷ HITB 2011 CTF – Reversing Vectored Exception Handling (VEH)
- ▷ Honeynet Workshop 2011
- ▷ Pastenum – Pastebin/pastie enumeration tool
- ▷ Codegate 2011 CTF – Binary200 – Anti Debugging Techniques Explained
- ▷ Cheat sheet : Installing Snorby 2.2 with Apache2 and Suricata with Barnyard2 on Ubuntu 10.x
- ▷ Anti-debugging tricks revealed – Defcon CTF Qualifications 2009: Bin300 Analysis
- ▷ Hack Notes : ROP retn+offset and Impact on stack setup
- ▷ The Honeypot Incident – How strong is your UF (Reversing FU)
- ▷ Death of an ftp client / Birth of Metasploit modules
- ▷ Cisco VoIP Phones – A Hackers Perspective
- ▷ WATOBO – the unofficial manual
- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 10 : Chaining DEP with ROP – the Rubik's[TM] Cube
- ▷ Blackhat Europe 2010 Barcelona – Day 10
- ▷ Blackhat Europe 2010 Barcelona – Day 01
- ▷ Exploiting Ken Ward Zipper : Taking advantage of payload conversion
- ▷ Ken Ward Zipper exploit write-up on abysssec.com
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- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 4 : From Exploit to Metasploit – The basics
- ▷ Exploit writing tutorial part 3b : SEH Based Exploits –


Once you get your courage up and believe that you can do important problems, then you can



Once you get your courage up and believe that you can do important problems, then you can



Once you get your courage up and believe that you can do important problems, then you can



Age

Einstein did things very early, and all the quantum mechanic fellows were disgustingly young when they did their best work..


# Wait? Are we too old?

## **Lifetime Achievement Award**

Most hackers have the personality of a supermodel who does discrete mathematics for fun. Like mathematicians, hackers get off on solving very obscure and difficult to even explain problems. Like models, hackers wear a lot of black, think they are more famous than they are, and their career effectively ends at age 30. Either way, upon entering one's fourth decade, it is time to put down the disassembler and consider a relaxing job in management.


This award is to honor the previous achievements of those who have moved on to bigger and better things such as management or owning (in the traditional sense) a coffee shop.

On the other hand, in music,  
politics and literature, often  
what we consider their best work  
was done late. I don't know how  
whatever field you are in fits this  
scale, but age has some effect.




When you are famous it is hard  
to work on small problems.  
This is what did Shannon in.  
After information theory, what  
do you do for an encore?

# PKCS #10 CERTIFICATE SIGNING REQUEST



Moxie Marlinspike  
Institute For Disruptive Studies



↑ [-] [Colonel\\_Ham\\_Sandwich](#) 16 points 18 days ago

↓ Firstly, congrats on the new internship, it sounds like a wonderful opportunity for you and I'm sure you'll love working with Apple.

I have a few question for you if wouldn't mind answering them. Firstly, why did you choose to get involved in specifically the iPhone jailbreaking scene, what was it attracted you to the iPhone? Secondly, did you always set out to be a hacker or was it just something that interested you and found you had a nack for? Finally, in regards to the PDF bug used for the JailbreakMe.com jailbreak, where on earth did you get the brilliant idea for it?

Thanks for doing this AMA!

[permalink](#)

↑ [-] [comex](#) [S] 23 points 18 days ago

↓ Firstly, why did you choose to get involved in specifically the iPhone jailbreaking scene, what was it attracted you to the iPhone?

I had one... and it was a device that (a) had a lot of functionality, (b) had a nice and flexible UNIX OS, (c) already had an active homebrew community, and (d) was really cool. :p

Secondly, did you always set out to be a hacker or was it just something that interested you and found you had a nack for?

I never wanted to be a black hat hacker, but I did enjoy hacking (originally SQL injection and crap) as a natural extension of programming.

Finally, in regards to the PDF bug used for the JailbreakMe.com jailbreak, where on earth did you get the brilliant idea for it?

FreeType was one of the less studied open source components of iOS.

So you need lot's of free  
time!



This brings up the subject ..  
of working conditions.  
What most people think are  
the best working  
conditions, are not.


So what you need is..

Now for the matter of **drive**.  
You observe that most great  
scientists have tremendous  
drive.

Newton said:

“If others would think as hard as I did, then they would get similar results.”





**thegrugq**

tell them that drinking that much takes effort and dedication, you can't just start out as the life of the party, you have to work at it! :D

8 hours ago  [Delete](#)

Outliers

THE STORY OF SUCCESS

MALCOLM GLADWELL

SMITHSONIAN BOOKS

# Outliers

THE STORY OF SUCCESS

MALCOLM  
GLADWELL

#1 bestselling author of *The Tipping Point* and *Blink*




How can anybody my age  
know as much as John  
Tukey does?

“You would be surprised  
Hamming, how much you  
would know if you worked  
as hard as he did that  
many years”



Knowledge and productivity are like compound interest.



Knowledge and productivity are  
like compound interest.

The more you know, the more  
you learn; the more you learn,  
the more you can do; the more  
you can do, the more the  
opportunity

Given two people of approximately the same ability and one person who works ten percent more than the other, the latter will more than twice outproduce the former.



**dinodaizovi** Dino A. Dai Zovi  by tavisio

If you have found a bug, chances are that someone else has also.  
And chances also are that the person is [@tavisio](#).

31 Aug 10  Favorite  Retweet  Reply




**taviso** Tavis Ormandy



This crackme was really hard work...fun though.

[http://www.crackmes.de/users/crp/trace\\_q/](http://www.crackmes.de/users/crp/trace_q/)

13 Apr 10  Favorite  Retweet  Reply




[http://www.crackmes.de/users/crp/trace\\_q/solution/taviso](http://www.crackmes.de/users/crp/trace_q/solution/taviso)



So it's a little bit hard?

Genius is 99%  
perspiration and 1%  
inspiration



# Karate Kid Ruined Us!

[http://www.cracked.com/article\\_18544\\_how-the-karate-kid-ruined-modern-world.html](http://www.cracked.com/article_18544_how-the-karate-kid-ruined-modern-world.html)


It's a lot hard!

It comes down to an emotional commitment. Most great scientists are completely committed to their problem. Those who don't become committed seldom produce outstanding, first-class work.

Everybody who has studied  
creativity is driven finally to  
saying:

“creativity comes out of your  
subconscious.”

Everybody who has studied  
creativity is driven finally to  
saying:  
“creativity comes out of your  
subconscious.”



<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zGt3-fx0vug>

Everybody who has studied  
creativity is driven finally to  
saying:  
“creativity comes out of your  
subconscious.”



Didn't he ever rest?

Lunch with the Chemists..

What are the important  
problems of your field?

What important problems  
are you working on?

The average  
scientist, so far as I can make out, spends  
almost all his time working on problems  
which he believes will not be important  
and he also doesn't believe that they will  
lead to important problems.

# Good & Bad Procrastination



<http://www.paulgraham.com/procrastination.html>

Great Thoughts Time.



When we win it's with small things,  
and the triumph itself makes us  
small.

What is extraordinary and eternal  
does not want to be bent by us.

Be Prepared..

Most great scientists know many important problems. They have something between 10 and 20 important problems for which they are looking for an attack. And when they see a new idea come up, one hears them say "Well that bears on this problem."

**They drop all the other things and get after it.**

“a horror story”

“they came in second!”

What if I have to work on  
little problems?

I want to talk on another topic. It is based on the song which I think many of you know:

“It ain't what you do, it's the way that you do it.”

Metasploit v2.0

+ -- --=[ msfconsole v2.0 [19 exploits - 27 payloads]

msf > show exploits

Metasploit Framework Loaded Exploits

=====

apache_chunked_win32	Apache Win32 Chunked Encoding
blackice_pam_icq	Blackice/RealSecure/Other ISS ICQ Parser Buffer Overflow
exchange2000_xexch50	Exchange 2000 MS03-46 Heap Overflow
frontpage_fp30reg_chunked	Frontpage fp30reg.dll Chunked Encoding
ia_webmail	IA WebMail 3.x Buffer Overflow
iis50_nsiislog_post	IIS 5.0 nsiislog.dll POST Overflow
iis50_printer_overflow	IIS 5.0 Printer Buffer Overflow
iis50_webdav_ntdll	IIS 5.0 WebDAV ntdll.dll Overflow
imail_ldap	IMail LDAP Service Buffer Overflow
msrpc_dcom_ms03_026	Microsoft RPC DCOM MS03-026
mssql2000_resolution	MSSQL 2000 Resolution Overflow
poptop_negative_read	PoPToP Negative Read Overflow
realserver_describe_linux	RealServer Describe Buffer Overflow
samba_trans2open	Samba trans2open Overflow
sambar6_search_results	Sambar 6 Search Results Buffer Overflow
servu_mdtm_overflow	Serv-U FTPD MDTM Overflow
solaris_sadmind_exec	Solaris sadmind Command Execution
upnp_winxp	Universal Plug N Play Overflow
warftpd_165_pass	War-FTPD 1.65 PASS Overflow

msf > □



You should do your job in such a fashion that others can build on top of it, so they will indeed say, "Yes, I've stood on so and so's shoulders and I saw further."

Metasploit v2.0

+ -- --=[ msfconsole v2.0 [19 exploits - 27 payloads]

msf > show exploits

Metasploit Framework Loaded Exploits

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exchange2000_xexch50	Exchange 2000 MS03-46 Heap Overflow
frontpage_fp30reg_chunked	Frontpage fp30reg.dll Chunked Encoding
ia_webmail	IA WebMail 3.x Buffer Overflow
iis50_nsiislog_post	IIS 5.0 nsiislog.dll POST Overflow
iis50_printer_overflow	IIS 5.0 Printer Buffer Overflow
iis50_webdav_ntdll	IIS 5.0 WebDAV ntdll.dll Overflow
imail_ldap	IMail LDAP Service Buffer Overflow
msrpc_dcom_ms03_026	Microsoft RPC DCOM MS03-026
mssql2000_resolution	MSSQL 2000 Resolution Overflow
poptop_negative_read	PoPToP Negative Read Overflow
realserver_describe_linux	RealServer Describe Buffer Overflow
samba_trans2open	Samba trans2open Overflow
sambar6_search_results	Sambar 6 Search Results Buffer Overflow
servu_mdtm_overflow	Serv-U FTPD MDTM Overflow
solaris_sadmind_exec	Solaris sadmind Command Execution
upnp_winxp	Universal Plug N Play Overflow
warftpd_165_pass	War-FTPD 1.65 PASS Overflow

msf > □



It's very ugly; you  
shouldn't have to do it



**dinodaizovi** Dino A. Dai Zovi  by tavisio

I learned years ago that if you care what the public thinks about your research or ideas, you must do marketing. Sucks, but it's true.

10 Aug 10

it is not sufficient to do a  
job, you have to sell it.

# Summary

- Work on important problems;
- Deny that it is all luck (pasteur)
- Great Thoughts

Is the effort .. worth it?



Absolutely..

The result is worth the struggle

.. because the truth is, **the value is in the struggle more than it is in the result.** The struggle to make something of yourself seems to be worthwhile in itself. The success and fame are sort of dividends, in my opinion.

so why do so many  
people, with all their  
talents, fail?

Well, one of the reasons is  
drive and commitment.

The people who do great work with less ability but who are committed to it, get more done than those who have great skill and dabble in it, who work during the day and go home and do other things and come back and work the next day.

You can lead a nice life; .. or you can  
be a great scientist.

If you want to lead a nice happy life  
with a lot of recreation and  
everything else, you'll lead a nice life.

The second thing is, I think, the problem of personality defects.

a .. personality defect is  
ego assertion..

and then most  
presciently..

Many a second-rate fellow  
gets caught up in some little  
**twitting** of the system, and  
carries it through to  
warfare.

self delusion..

There are so many alibis.  
Why weren't you first? Why  
didn't you do it right? Don't  
try an alibi. Don't try and  
kid yourself. You can tell  
other people all the alibis  
you want. I don't mind. But  
to yourself try to be honest.

you need to know yourself,  
your weaknesses, your  
strengths, and your bad  
faults, like my egotism.

# Summary

(People don't win because)

- Don't work on important problems;
- Don't become emotionally involved;
- Keep giving themselves alibis
- Keep saying "it's luck"

I've told you how easy it is;  
furthermore I've told you  
how to reform. Therefore,  
go forth and become great

# Vragen ?

[@haroonmeer](http://blog.thinkst.com)

[www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/YouAndYourResearch.html](http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/YouAndYourResearch.html)